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 ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY: 
SOME CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE  
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
While much attention has been devoted to analyzing how the institutional 
framework and entrepreneurship impact growth, how economic policy and 
institutional design affect entrepreneurship appears to be much less analyzed. We 
try to explain cross-country differences in the level of entrepreneurship by 
differences in economic policy and institutional design. Specifically, we use the 
measures of economic freedom to ask which elements of economic policy making 
and the institutional framework that are responsible for the supply of 
entrepreneurship (our data on entrepreneurship are derived from the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor). The combination of these two datasets is unique in the 
literature. We find that the size of government is negatively correlated with 
entrepreneurial activity but that sound money is positively correlated with 
entrepreneurial activity. Other measures of economic freedom are not significantly 
correlated with entrepreneurship.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Societies do not grow and prosper without entrepreneurs. The history of all rich societies is 
ripe with entrepreneurs: Julius Caesar’s friend Balbus went to Rome from a far-away 
province (Spain) and worked his way up through the ranks to become one of the richest 
people in the Empire, and on his way built both theatres and baths; Thomas Edison’s 
inventions both made him one of the most famous people of his age and brought electric 
light and many other modern appliances to ordinary people; and in more recent years, Bill 
Gates founded one of the world’s largest personal fortunes by bringing the computer age 
into people’s homes. Common to these three individuals and countless other less known is 
entrepreneurial ability and will. And while culture may vary, it is arguable that the particular 
characteristics of entrepreneurship are anthropological constants (Mises, 1949; Kirzner, 
1997; Russell and Rath, 2002). 
 Yet, we observe rather large differences in entrepreneurial activity across countries 
and time, particularly if entrepreneurship is proxied by such measures as self-employment, 
new firm formation and the like (Blau, 1987; Blanchflower, 2000). Some countries are ripe 
with entrepreneurs who found firms in many different industries (e.g., United States), while 
in others new firm formation is more of an exception (e.g., Sweden). In this paper, we try to 
explain such cross-country differences by differences in economic policy and institutional 
design. Specifically, we use the well-known economic freedom indices (Gwartney and 
Lawson, 2005) to ask which elements of economic policy making and the institutional 
framework that are responsible for the supply of entrepreneurs and the level of 
entrepreneurship in societies. Our data on entrepreneurship are derived from the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (http://www.gemconsortium.org), a research consortium that 
collects cross-national data on numerous aspects of entrepreneurship.  The combination of 
these two datasets is unique in the literature.  
 In the last two to three decades, interest in institutions (Dixit, 1996; North, 1990), 
growth (Romer, 1990), and entrepreneurship (Segerstrom, Anant, and Dinopoulos, 1990; 
Baumol, 1993) has strongly increased in economics (although roughly speaking, interest in 
institutions and growth is still much larger than interest in entrepreneurship; cf. Bianchi and 
Henrekson, 2005). In particular, the intersections between these three areas have been fertile 
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areas of research. Thus, much of recent growth theory has been concerned with exploring 
cross-country links betweens institutions (and economic policies) and growth (e.g., Olson, 
1982; Barro, 1991; Sachs and Warner, 1997), and there has also been some interest in 
linking entrepreneurship and growth (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Wennekers and Thurik, 
1999; Audretsch and Thurik, 2001; Carree and Thurik, 2002).   
 Less interest appears to have devoted to the issue of how institutions and economic 
policy impact the level of entrepreneurship,1 arguably because of the well known difficulties 
of modelling the entrepreneurial function and measuring the incidence and effects of 
entrepreneurship (cf. Bianchi and Henrekson, 2005). However, this may be seen as a 
lacunae in the literature to the extent that the link from the institutional framework and 
economic policies to growth is meditated by entrepreneurial activity.2 In Israel Kirzner’s 
terms, the entrepreneur is the “prime mover of progress” (Kirzner, 1980) and neglecting the 
entrepreneur implies neglecting an important mechanism in the growth process.  
 The design of the paper is the following.  First, we outline some existing theories of 
entrepreneurial activity.  Most economic theories of entrepreneurship are extremely abstract 
and do not enter into specific discussions of the institutional and economic policy 
determinants of entrepreneurship.  Accordingly, we provide such a discussion.  Secondly, 
we report a set of cross-country regressions that explain various measures of 
entrepreneurship and innovation in terms of variables drawn from the economic freedom 
indices. Finally, we discuss the findings and conclude with a set of policy recommendations 
for countries wanting to increase their entrepreneurial dynamism.  
 In sum, the contribution of this paper is to empirically examine the institutional and 
economic policy determinants of entrepreneurship and innovation, using datasets that while 
enjoying some use individually have not hitherto been brought together in a single analysis.  
 
 
                                                 
1 However, see Audretsch, Thurik and Verheul (2002) for some cross-country comparisons and Kreft and 
Sobel (2005) for cross-state comparisons in a US context. 
2  This is not entirely unproblematic, because, as argued by Baumol (1990), entrepreneurship may well be 
unproductive and even destructive. For example, entrepreneurship may be exercised in criminal or rent-
seeking activities. However, Baumol assumes that the supply of entrepreneurship is constant (while its 
allocation over productive, unproductive and destructive activities may differ). Clearly, this is a strong 
assumption, and there are reasons to assume that the supply of entrepreneurship is in fact dependent on the 
returns to entrepreneurship (Kirzner, 1985; Henreksson, 2005). 
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THEORIES OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ITS DETERMINANTS 
The Phenomenon of Entrepreneurship 
 Because entrepreneurs in many ways personify market forces, one might expect 
entrepreneurs to be the central figures in economics, that is, to be recognized as “the single 
most important player in a modern economy” (Lazear, 2002: 1). As numerous writers ⎯ from 
Hayek (1946) over Baumol (1968) to Bianchi and Henrekson (2005) ⎯ have lamented, the 
real world importance of entrepreneurs is not reflected in economic theorizing. Yet, what is 
usually seen as the founding contribution to the economics of entrepreneurship, Richard 
Cantillon’s (1755) Essai sur la nature de commerce en géneral (1755), actually precedes the 
Wealth of Nations by more than two decades, and many different conceptions of 
entrepreneurship have been developed in the economics literature.  In the following, we 
briefly survey these.3  
 Entrepreneurship as management. In the entrepreneurship curriculum of many 
business schools, the phenomenon under investigation has often been “small-business 
management.” Entrepreneurs are pictured as the managers of small, family-owned 
businesses or start-up companies. Entrepreneurship consists of routine management tasks, 
relationships with venture capitalists and other sources of external finance, product 
development, marketing, and so on. Unfortunately, this notion of entrepreneurship is 
sufficiently elastic to be practically meaningless as it appears to include virtually all aspects 
of small or new business management, while excluding the identical tasks when performed 
within a large or established business.  Put differently, if entrepreneurship is simply a set of 
management activities, or any management activity that takes place within a particular type 
of firm, then it is unclear why we should bother to add this label to those activities.   
 Entrepreneurship as imagination or creativity. It is common, particularly within the 
management literature, to associate entrepreneurship with boldness, daring, imagination, or 
creativity (Begley and Boyd, 1987; Lumpkin and Dess, 1996).  These accounts emphasize 
the personal, psychological characteristics of the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurship, in this 
                                                 
3 More extensive discussions can be found in Barretto (1989), Praag (1999), Bianchi and Henrekson (2005) 
and Foss and Klein (2005).   
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conception, is not a necessary component of all human decision-making, but a specialized 
activity that some individuals are particularly well equipped to perform.4  
 Entrepreneurship as innovation. The most cited conception of entrepreneurship in 
economics is Joseph Schumpeter’s idea of the entrepreneur as innovator (e.g., Segerstrom et 
al., 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Baumol, 1993). Schumpeter’s entrepreneur introduces 
“new combinations”— new products, production methods, markets, sources of supply, or 
industrial combinations — shaking the economy out of its previous equilibrium through a 
process Schumpeter termed “creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1911). Realizing that the 
entrepreneur has no place in the general-equilibrium system of Walras, whom Schumpeter 
greatly admired, Schumpeter gave the entrepreneur a role as the source of economic 
change.5 Schumpeter carefully distinguished the entrepreneur from the capitalist (and 
strongly criticized the neoclassical economists for confusing the two).  His entrepreneur 
need not own capital, or even work within the confines of a business firm at all. In 
Schumpeter’s conception, “people act as entrepreneurs only when they actually carry out 
new combinations, and lose the character of entrepreneurs as soon as they have built up 
their business, after which they settle down to running it as other people run their 
businesses” (Ekelund and Hébert, 1990: 569). Thus, even if by innovating the entrepreneur 
succeeds in establishing a monopoly that give rise to indefinite returns, “… the flow of 
gains to the entrepreneur in her entrepreneurial role must be very temporary” (Baumol, 
1993: 7).  
 Entrepreneurship as alertness or discovery. The perhaps strongest competitor to the 
Schumpeterian conception is the notion of entrepreneurship as “alertness” to profit 
opportunities. While present in Cantillon’s and J. B. Clark’s notions of entrepreneurship, 
this concept has been elaborated most fully by Israel Kirzner (e.g., 1997). Kirzner follows 
Hayek (1968) in describing competition as a discovery process:  the source of 
entrepreneurial profit is superior foresight — the discovery of something (new products, 
cost-saving technology) unknown to other market participants. The simplest case is that of 
                                                 
4 Note that the relevant personal characteristics can presumably be acquired by contract on the market by 
purchasing consulting services, project management, and the like.  A “non-entrepreneurial” owner or manager, 
in other words, can manage the day-to-day operations of the firm, purchasing entrepreneurial services on the 
market as needed.  Moreover, the literature does not explain clearly whether imagination and creativity are 
necessary, sufficient, or incidental conditions for entrepreneurship.  Clearly the founders of many firms are 
imaginative and creative.  If not, are they not entrepreneurs? 
5 This includes, but is not limited to, the formation of new business ventures.  
 6
the arbitrageur, who discovers a discrepancy in present prices that can be exploited for 
financial gain. In a more typical case, the entrepreneur is alert to a new product or a superior 
production process and steps in to fill this market gap before others. Success, in this view, 
comes not from following a well-specified maximization problem, but from having some 
knowledge or insight that no one else has — that is, from something beyond the given 
optimization framework.6  
 Kirzner’s entrepreneurs do not own capital; they need only be alert to profit 
opportunities.  Because they own no assets, they bear no uncertainty. Critics have seized on 
this as a defect in Kirzner’s conception. According to this criticism, mere alertness to a 
profit opportunity is not sufficient for earning profits. To reap financial gain, the 
entrepreneur must invest resources to realize the discovered profit opportunity.  Moreover, 
excepting the few cases where buying low and selling high are nearly instantaneous (say, 
electronic trading of currencies or commodity futures), even arbitrage transactions require 
some time to complete. The selling price may fall before the arbitrageur has made his sale, 
and thus even the pure arbitrageur faces some probability of loss. In Kirzner’s formulation, 
the worst that can happen to an entrepreneur is the failure to discover an existing profit 
opportunity.  Entrepreneurs either earn profits or break even, but it is unclear how they 
suffer losses. 
 Entrepreneurship as judgment. An alternative to the foregoing accounts is that 
entrepreneurship consists of judgmental decision-making under conditions of uncertainty.  
Judgment refers primarily to business decision-making when the range of possible future 
outcomes, let alone the likelihood of individual outcomes, is generally unknown (what Knight 
[1921] terms uncertainty, rather than probabilistic risk). Judgment is distinct from boldness, 
innovation, alertness, and leadership. Judgment must be exercised in mundane 
circumstances, for ongoing operations as well as new ventures. While alertness tends to be 
passive, judgment is active. Entrepreneurs “are those who seek to profit by actively 
promoting adjustment to change. They are not content to passively adjust their . . . activities 
to readily foreseeable changes or changes that have already occurred in their circumstances; 
                                                 
6 Kirzner’s view of superior foresight differs from Stigler’s concept of search in which the value of new 
knowledge is known in advance, available to anyone willing to pay the relevant search costs. “Stigler's 
searcher decides how much time it is worth spending rummaging through dusty attics and untidy drawers 
looking for a sketch which (the family recalls) Aunt Enid thought might be by Lautrec. Kirzner’s entrepreneur 
enters a house and glances lazily at the pictures which have been hanging in the same place for years. ‘Isn't 
that a Lautrec on the wall?’” (Ricketts, 1987: 58). 
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rather, they regard change itself as an opportunity to meliorate their own conditions and 
aggressively attempt to anticipate and exploit it” (Salerno, 1993: 123). Those who specialize 
in judgmental decision-making may be dynamic, charismatic leaders, but they need not 
possess these traits. Decision making under uncertainty is entrepreneurial, whether it 
involves imagination, creativity, leadership, and related factors or not.  
 A definition of entrepreneurship. Drawing on the above contributions to the 
economics of entrepreneurship, and echoing (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999: 46-7), we define 
“entrepreneurship as the manifest ability and willingness of individuals” to perceive new 
economic opportunities and to introduce their ways of seizing these opportunities into the 
market in the face of uncertainty. Following Schumpeter, these opportunities may consist in 
new products, new processes, new modes of organization, and new product-market 
combinations. Individuals may exercise this ability and willingness on their own, as 
manager/owners of firms, as intrapreneurs within firms, and as part of teams inside firms.  
They do so by making uncertain decisions on the deployment of valuable resources. In sum, 
we define entrepreneurship as a behavioral characteristic of persons.  
Determinants of Entrepreneurship 
 The above summaries of the classical contributions to the economics of 
entrepreneurship suggest several immediate determinants of entrepreneurship. Thus, 
Schumpeter and Knight both focus on determinants that are inherent to potential 
entrepreneurs such as the degree to which a person is “venturesome” (Knight, 1921) or has 
the “ambition” and “intelligence” to exercise “leadership” (Schumpeter, 1911).  In contrast, 
there is rather little specificity in the classical contributions on the institutional and 
economic policy prerequisites for (successful) entrepreneurship. Both Knight and 
Schumpeter stress the availability of credit. Schumpeter also links the exercise of 
entrepreneurship to the supply of other opportunities for social distinction.   
 However, one seeks in vain in the classical statements for more precise discussions of 
the institutional and economic policy antecedents to entrepreneurial activity, perhaps 
because the notion ⎯ now entirely commonplace ⎯  that institutions imply systems of 
incentives was not widespread at the time when Schumpeter and Knight wrote. Moreover, 
state apparatuses did not have anything like the size they do in contemporary welfare states, 
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so it is understandable that the classical contributions missed out on this and in general 
emphasized individual-level determinants.  
 A partial exception is constituted by the (admittedly much more recent) work of 
Kirzner (1985). Kirzner (1985: 11) argues that the opportunity of profit switches on 
entrepreneurial alertness. Price discrepancies, representing profit opportunies, are "flashing 
red lights” that alert entrepreneurs to pockets of ignorance in the market. By closing these 
pockets, that is, exploiting gains from trade, entrepreneurs equilibrate the market.  However, 
the signaling system of the market can be hampered in various ways. Thus, Kirzner argues 
that government intervention, such as minimum prices, price ceilings, and outright 
nationalization destroys the informational signaling process of the market. Government 
intervention which aims to improve market outcomes is based on the usually fallacious 
presumption that government bureaucrats know in advance what the market will reveal. In 
addition to this fundamental knowledge problem comes the motivational problem that 
government bureaucrats, unlike entrepreneurs, do not have sufficient incentives to discover 
the correct prices.  
Institutional Determinants of Entrepreneurship  
 How institutions affect the supply and quality of entrepreneurial efforts as well as how 
it affects whether entrepreneurship is associated with commercial success has been a 
relatively under-researched area in the mainstream economics, although much applied 
research in small business economics, economic geography, innovation studies, etc. has 
dealt with how institutions and economic policy influence small firm formation and the rate 
of innovation.  The set of possible determinants of entrepreneurship is very large indeed, 
including the size of the government, the degree of administrative complexity/bureaucracy, 
the tax environment, the intellectual property rights regime, the enforcement of property 
rights in general, the level of trust, competition law, political freedom, labor laws, social 
security regime, bankruptcy law, corruption, crime, the ethnic composition of the 
population, availability of finance capital, etc. Some of these have been examined in 
previous work (e.g., Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder, 1997; Grilo and Thurik, 2003). In the 
following we discuss those determinants that may be related to the notion of “economic 
freedom,” a composite construct that includes such components that all ultimately boil down 
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to the security and extent of property rights, but include, for example, the freedom to save, 
change jobs, contractual freedom, to keep income, etc.   
Economic Freedom and Entrepreneurship 
 Classical-liberal scholars have very often used the size of government in a broad sense 
⎯ that is, the extent to which the government intervenes in the economy through 
government consumption, redistribution through transfer schemes, public investments, and 
marginal taxation ⎯  as a good measure of economic freedom. There are many reasons why 
the size of government may be expected on apriori grounds to influence entrepreneurship 
(cf. Mirrlees, 1971).  
 Most directly, if economic activities in certain industries or sectors have essentially 
been nationalized, the scope for entrepreneurship is reduced, as nationalization often (but of 
course not necessarily) implies a public monopoly. This is in most parts of the Western 
industrialized world clearly the case of child care, health care, and care of the elderly. More 
indirect governmental control, such as requirements that certain trades be certified, may also 
reduce entrepreneurial activity for example, because certification amounts to barriers to 
entry (Demsetz, 1982).  
 To the extent that a large government is associated high levels of publicly financed 
provision of various services (e.g., care of the elderly, education, etc.) and with generous 
social security systems, the incentives to engage in entrepreneurial acts in order to make a 
living (what may be called “necessity entrepreneurship”) are reduced because a relatively 
high reservation wage is practically guaranteed. However, such schemes also reduce 
incentives for individual wealth formation which may be expected to negatively influence 
the level of entrepreneurial activity (Henreksson, 2005: 11). One reason has to do with 
entrepreneurial judgment being idiosyncratic and often hard to clearly communicate to 
potential investors (Knight, 1921). The entrepreneur may have to finance his venture 
himself, at least in the start-up phase. If individual wealth formation is reduced because of 
generous public transfer schemes, etc., this makes such financing difficult.  Moreover, if 
entrepreneurs are only able to commit little personal capital to their entrepreneurial venture, 
their signal to potential outside investors concerning their commitment to the venture is 
correspondingly weaker.    
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 A large government needs to be financed, ultimately by taxation. As Henrekson (2005: 
9) rightly points out,  
[i]n order to analyze how the tax system impacts on entrepreneurial behaviour, it 
is not sufficient to focus on the taxation of owners of firms. To a large extent, the 
return on entrepreneurial effort is taxed as wage income. 
One reason is that parts of the income that accrue from closely held companies may be paid 
out as wage income (depending on the specific tax regime), and that entrepreneurial activity 
may be carried out by employees.  Rewards for entrepreneurial behaviour in firms (e.g., 
stock options, bonuses for suggesting improvements, etc.) are taxed as wage income.  
Henrekson (2005: 14) also points out a high level of taxation moves many household-related 
services out of the reach for entrepreneurial exploitation.: “… higher rates of personal 
taxation discourage the market provision of goods and services that substitute closely for 
home-produced services” (p.15).  
 A related, yet distinct, item in an overall measure of economic freedom relates to the 
enforcement of property rights, that is, the extent to which property rights are secure over 
time (North, 1990; Barzel, 2005). Huge literatures in economic history, intellectual property 
rights, and innovation stress the importance for entrepreneurial activity at the micro level 
and economic development at the macro level of property rights being well-defined and 
enforced.  If so, it should be expected that institutional features such as the quality of 
regulations and the judicial system affects overall level of entrepreneurial activity. 
 A third important item in an economic freedom measure arguably is sound money 
(Friedman, 1962), in particular the rate and variability of inflation. While anticipations of 
future relative prices are important in general for economic decision makers, it is arguable 
that they matter particularly much for entrepreneurs because entrepreneurs are essentially 
speculators who receive a residual income (Knight, 1921; Kirzner, 1997). Inflation, and 
particularly erratic inflation “jams” the signalling effects of relative prices (Friedman, 
1977). While this may be less of a problem for risk-loving entrepreneurs, many 
entrepreneurs may well be risk-averse, particularly those who engage in necessity 
entrepreneurship or activity within well-developed sectors. 
 Finally, following Kirzner (1985) public regulation is an important item in an 
economic freedom measure that is relevant to explaining the prevalence of entrepreneurial 
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activity. Arguably, regulations can both help and hinder entrepreneurs who need clear rules 
and predictable enforcement of those rules. On the other hand, excessive regulations impose 
burdens on all firms, not the least start-ups, that may be prohibitive. In addition, Baumol 
(1990) made the point that individuals operating in heavily regulated economic environment 
may have larger gains from engaging in rent-seeking activities within the public sector ― 
what he termed “destructive entrepreneurship” ― than in real economic activities. 
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Data Sources, Variables, and Models 
 The data used in this study is drawn from three different sources and summarized in 
Table 1. 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
Insert Table 1 Here 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
First, the dependent variables in the following are from the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor Consortium (GEM) 2001 dataset, a rich large-scale questionnaire survey conducted 
in 29 countries in representative samples of individuals between 18 and 64 years; in total, 
approximately 77,000 respondents are included. The data contain answers to a large array of 
questions on both entrepreneurial activity, the reasons for the activities, how they were 
financed as well as a battery of background questions. We use three variables constructed 
from the data. The variables, aggregated at the country level, are:7  
• TEA denotes the level of total entrepreneurial activity, measured by the proportion 
of respondents in each country who answer that they engaged in the upstart of an 
economic activity – starting a firm - within the sampling period. As such, the 
variable measures all firm upstarts regardless of the type of firm and the reason for 
the activity. 
                                                 
7 For readers who may want to use the GEM database themselves, we use the variables denoted “tea01”, 
“tea01opp” and “tea01nec” to form our aggregate data. 
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Since the GEM database also includes questions on the reason why respondents may have 
started a firm of their own, we can distinguish between two broad types of entrepreneurial 
activity, “opportunity entrepreneurship” and “necessity entrepreneurship”. 
• TEAOPP is the proportion of the same sample who state that they have engaged in 
an activity for the reason that they perceive that it represents an economic 
opportunity to them (“opportunity entrepreneurship”); and  
• TEANEC is the proportion of the same sample who state that they engaged in an 
activity for the reason that they perceived it as “necessary”, probably in order to 
uphold a decent standard of living or, in developing countries, to be able to support 
their family (“necessity entrepreneurship”).  
 It should be stressed that we thus only measure the actual economic entrepreneurial 
activity through firm upstarts. Hence, it must be emphasized that we neither capture 
whatever entrepreneurial activity occurs within existing firms, nor do we in any way 
measure the potential activity that there may have been in a country, had barriers to such 
activity not been in place. It is nevertheless clear that there is a substantial amount of cross-
country variation, even in a sample consisting of only 29 countries. The TEA data are 
distributed between a minimum of 2.9% of the sample population (Japan) to a maximum of 
20.2% (Mexico); the opportunity index is distributed between 1.3% (Japan) and 13.3% 
(Mexico), while the necessity index is distributed between .2% (Denmark) and 6.8% 
(Mexico). The country-level data on entrepreneurship are summarized in Table 2. 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
Insert Table 2 Here 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
 In the following, we control for the logarithm to GDP per capita, measured in 
purchasing power parity-adjusted US dollars and taken from the Penn World Tables (Heston 
et al., 2002). We also control for regional variations by including dummies for Sub-Saharan 
Africa, North Africa and the Middle East, Latin America, and the post-communist countries 
in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
 Finally, our policy variables are from the freedom data, assembled by the Canadian 
Fraser Institute and published annually in Gwartney and Lawson (2005). The economic 
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freedom indices have been used in a large number of studies documenting, among other 
things, their substantial effects on economic growth rates (e.g. Berggren, 2003). In the use 
of this type of data in this context, we follow Kreft and Sobel (2005). We use all five sub-
indices of economic freedom. These are: 
• Government size ⎯ which measures the extent to which the government 
intervenes in the economy through consumption, redistribution through 
transfer schemes, public investments, and marginal taxation. For this particular 
index, we alternatively split it into its four sub-components. 
• Legal quality ⎯  which measures the protection and respect for the rights of 
people to their owl lives and rightfully acquired property. The legal quality 
index is composed of indicators of judicial independence, impartiality of the 
courts, protection of intellectual property rights, military interference in law 
and politics, and integrity of the legal system. 
• Sound money ⎯  which consists of the rate and variability of inflation and 
monetary controls, which is a measure of the consistency of monetary policy. 
• International trade ⎯ which measures the extent of trade and barriers to trade 
and capital flows, both through actual trade and investment flows and through 
indicators of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and capital. 
• Regulatory quality ⎯ which is composed of three sub-indices measuring the 
freedom from government regulations and controls in the labour market, 
financial markets, and the price controls in the markets for goods and services. 
These three areas are again composed of: 1) the impact of minimum wages, 
hiring and firing practices, the share of the labour force with wages set in 
centralized bargaining, the generosity of unemployment benefits, and the use 
of conscript military personnel; 2) the percentage of deposits held in privately 
owned banks, bank competition, percentage of credit extended to the private 
sector, and the extent of interest rate controls; and 3) price controls, 
administrative procedures that are obstacles to business, time spent with the 
bureaucracy, the ease of starting new businesses, and the necessity of irregular 
payments. 
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Some Cross-Country Tests 
 We include these variables in a set of simple OLS regressions explaining either the full 
TEA scores or the TEAOPP or TEANEC variables; Table 3 shows the results of the 
regressions including all five areas of economic freedom. It also reports the results of using 
the robust regression technique, which iteratively downweighs potential outlier observations 
based on the size of their residuals. This alternative procedure thus tests whether results 
obtained by OLS can be generalized to the full 29-country sample or are driven by single 
countries, which is an especially important potential problem given our small sample size. 
The table shows that even with such a small sample, the specification does a fairly good job 
at explaining the variation. The explanatory power (R squared) varies between 40 and 83%, 
and all F-tests for joint inclusion of the specification are significant, although the one for 
TEAOPP fails the 1% level. The inclusion of all five indices of economic freedom neither 
proves to a problem as indicated by the low variance inflation factor (See footnote of table 
3). 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
Insert Table 3 Here 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
 It is immediately apparent from the table that economic development is strongly and 
negatively associated with entrepreneurial activity. Hence, even though such activity forms 
an important determinant of the growth of income, it tends to decrease with the level of 
incomes. However, this relation is not significant for opportunity activity (TEAOPP) while 
being strongly so for necessity activity (TEANEC). As such, development seems to reduce 
the amount of entrepreneurial activity which is caused by the need to engage in such 
activity, which is the main reason for the latter type while not necessarily reducing the 
perceived opportunities. The table also shows that, as of 2001, the post-communist countries 
do not deviate systematically from other comparable countries. Even though one might fear 
so, we do not find any sign of path dependency of a system that strongly discouraged private 
activity. 
 Turning to the policy variables, we first of all find that the size of government is 
strongly positively related to both total activity as well as the shares arising from 
opportunity or necessity. Remembering that a larger score on this index means less 
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government intervention, this is quite clear evidence of a depressing effect of government 
activity, which we explore further in Table 4 below. The estimate suggests a substantial 
effect, as a one standard deviation improvement results in a rise in entrepreneurial 
opportunity activity of roughly 85% of a standard deviation. Second, we fail to find any 
effects of legal quality, the freedom to trade internationally, or the extent of the regulatory 
framework.8 We do, however, also find evidence of a strong effect of having access to 
sound money on both the level of total activity as well as on opportunity and necessity 
entrepreneurship. Here, a one standard deviation improvement of sound money is associated 
with an increase of 53% of a standard deviation of TEAOPP and a 49% increase of 
TEANEC. The effect is evidently somewhat stronger for entrepreneurial activity based on 
the presumption of opportunity, yet it is not entirely robust to being estimated by robust 
regressions as the insignificance of sound money using either TEA or TEAOPP is due to the 
influence of the three richest countries in the sample. Once excluded, all results are 
significant and robust. The same result applies if we instead use the logarithm to the sound 
money index, which has the effect of allowing for larger effects of having very poor 
monetary consistency (low scores). The reason for this is most likely that once passed a 
certain threshold of economic development, virtually all countries have set up independent 
monetary authorities to ensure that citizens have access to stable and predictable money. As 
such, there is very little variation at the top of the sound money index, which prevents 
identification of an effect in relatively rich countries. 
 In sum, Table 3 shows substantial evidence for the effects of two types of economic 
freedom on the level of entrepreneurial activity. However, the government size index covers 
a fairly disparate set of sub-indices. We therefore split this index into its component parts in 
Table 4, in which we keep the logarithm to GDP, the post-communist dummy and the sound 
money index in the specification while excluding the three insignificant freedom indices. It 
should also be noted that for three of the four sub-indices, we use the underlying real data. 
Hence, “government consumption” is measured as the share of government consumption in 
total consumption; transfers and subsidies as a percentage of total GDP; and public 
investment as a share of total investments. The exception is the (lack of marginal) taxation 
index, which we keep as an index since it includes both the size of marginal taxes as well as 
                                                 
8 It should be noted that if we instead use actual trade volumes, which can also be obtained from the Penn 
World Tables, we obtain the same non-result as with the trade index from the Fraser Institute. 
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the share of the labour force that face the highest marginal tax rate. Again, the regressions 
do a fairly decent job of explaining the cross-country variation although the R squared is 
much larger when TEANEC is the dependent variable, which is due to the strong and 
significant impact of economic development.9 
 This point is clear as (the logarithm to) GDP per capita is consistently significant with 
a very large coefficient in the first four columns while it only becomes significant in one of 
the four right-hand side columns by coincidence. Again, the post-communist dummy is 
never significant, indicating that the Eastern European countries have rapidly come to 
resemble the rest of the Free World on this count. Likewise, sound money is significant 
throughout the table with both TEANEC and TEAOPP as the dependent variable. 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
Insert Table 4 here 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
 Turning to the government size variables and starting in the four left-hand columns of 
Table 4, in which the necessity component of total entrepreneurial activity is the dependent 
variable, only one of the four underlying variables is significant.10 This variable, 
government consumption, may proxy for unemployment benefits and other welfare 
arrangements that lower the chances of having to set up a business out of necessity. 
 The results are different when we turn to the determinants of necessity 
entrepreneurship. First of all, the share of total consumption pertaining to the government 
sector has a strong negative influence on TEAOPP. The coefficient, which is almost three 
times larger than with TEANEC, indicates that a one standard deviation to government 
consumption in this sample would induce a loss of opportunity entrepreneurship of about 
90% of a standard deviation. Second, the share of transfers and subsidies in total GDP also 
exerts a negative influence on TEAOPP. Here, the estimate suggests that a one standard 
deviation increase in transfers would induce a loss of about 70% of a standard deviation.  
                                                 
9 Naturally, we have also performed tests with the three constituent subindices – labour, credit and business 
regulations - forming the overall regulation variable. These results are not reported here as they show no 
association. Hence, the extent of regulations and controls in the labour market seem unassociated with 
entrepreneurship in this sample even though other studies have argued for a strong correlation (e.g. Kreft and 
Sobel, 2005). 
10 It is worth mentioning that the regressions with public investment contain many missing observations. If we 
attempt to substitute the missing observations with data from other sources, we get a negative association 
between necessity entrepreneurship and public investment, but no relation with opportunity activity. 
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 Finally, the lack of taxation index also has a positive influence, that is, raising the 
marginal income tax rate or expanding the share of the labour force paying this rate affects 
the level of opportunity entrepreneurship negatively. The estimate here suggests that a one 
standard deviation deterioration of the index would induce a loss of about 40% of a standard 
deviation. 
 Overall, we thus find that both the access to sound money and three different 
components of government size are strongly associated with national levels of opportunity 
entrepreneurship while sound money and one of the government indices are associated with 
necessity entrepreneurship. In the following, we discuss the potential reasons for these 
effects and their economic significance. 
DISCUSSION 
 First, we summarize the overall findings pertaining to government size in Figure 1, 
which reports the average level of entrepreneurial activity in the half of the sample with a 
small government sector and a large government sector, respectively. The figure also 
provides a “feel” for the size of the differences as the height of the columns are percent of 
the sample average. 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
Insert Figure 1 here 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
Exemplifying the Results 
 The figure provides an illustration of the economic significance of the size of 
government. If, for example, Denmark was to raise its current score on the government size 
index (3.75) to the average of the remaining four areas (8.5), it would raise its TEAOPP by 
about eight points. While this is quite clearly an overestimate by being more than two 
standard deviations of the TEAOPP variable – the GEM survey shows that only about 4.5% 
of the Danish population engage in entrepreneurship - it nevertheless indicates the 
substantial importance of having an oversize government sector. Differences in individuals’ 
access to sound money are also important but with about half the effect as that of the overall 
government index. 
 That government consumption has an effect on the level of necessity entrepreneurship 
should not be surprising, regardless of whether one holds a statist or classical-liberal view of 
 18
the economy, as this variable includes both unemployment benefit expenditures and various 
public goods that, if not provided by the government, might entail a financial burned for the 
poor. However, the effect on opportunity entrepreneurship is approximately three times 
larger than that on necessity entrepreneurship. This finding clearly contradicts the popular 
claims by Scandinavian politicians, vigorously repeated in Southern European media, that 
the “welfare state” increases the economic dynamism by protecting people from adverse 
effects of failing.11 Instead, the empirical findings rather clearly indicate that central traits of 
the welfare state – strong redistribution by either public goods, reflected in government 
consumption and public investments, or high marginal taxation – are all strongly negatively 
associated with opportunity entrepreneurship. 
 On a note of caution, it is important to stress that our results do not inform about the 
survival of firms resulting from entrepreneurial activities, only the likelihood of such 
activity occurring. It is therefore entirely possible that a casual examination of the cross-
country differences in total entrepreneurial activity might overstate the benefits of 
entrepreneurship potentially available to single countries if there is either: 1) country-level 
decreasing marginal returns to total activity; or 2) that a higher level of activity also reflects 
a larger proportion of such activities failing. However, we must also stress that although 
entrepreneurial activity is probably a necessary condition for economic development, even 
in the Soviet Union under Stalin bureaucrats knew this fact and consequently allowed for 
some level of private initiative (Gregory and Harrison, 2005). Hence, the cross-country 
differences should neither be under- nor overestimated, but simply treated with the usual 
caution. 
Related Work 
 The present study forms part of the small literature on macroeconomic determinants of 
entrepreneurship as well as the much larger literature on economic freedom and economic 
growth. In this paper, we primarily take Kreft and Sobel’s (2005) US findings to a cross-
country context, replicating one of their findings while producing another that probably by 
definition cannot be obtained in national comparisons as monetary policy is national by 
nature. First, we bring Henrekson’s (2005) thoughts on welfare state characteristics and 
                                                 
11 See also Henreksson (2005) for an excellent analysis of how the welfare state (in casu: the Swedish welfare 
state) stifles incentives for entrepreneurship.   
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entrepreneurship to a cross-country test, which provides strong support for his theoretically 
valid notion that excessive government interventions and direct government activity in the 
economy crowds out private entrepreneurship. Naturally, we cannot say whether 
government size mainly affects the context in which potential entrepreneurs work and their 
incentives to unfold their entrepreneurial abilities, or whether systems with large 
governments instead mainly limit entrepreneurship by transforming norms and privately 
held beliefs about society.12 On the other hand, the finding that citizens’ access to sound 
money, i.e. the existence of a consistent and predictable monetary policy, also adds to 
entrepreneurship cannot be ascribed to beliefs or incentives. Contrary to government size, it 
is an entirely contextual factor that limits prospective entrepreneurs’ access to financing 
their entrepreneurial endeavors. An inconsistent monetary policy will also tend to bring 
noise to the economic signals that Kirzner (1985) argues are crucial to the discovery of 
entrepreneurial options.  
 Our paper also provides an addition to the quite extensive literature on economic 
freedom. This literature has first and foremost demonstrated that aspects of economic 
freedom and other institutional measures are strongly associated with economic 
performance and economic growth (Grubel, 1998; Carlsson and Lundström, 2001; 
Berggren, 2003; de Haan et al., 2006). Whether this association comes about through the 
effects of economic freedom on factor accumulation or productivity growth is still 
uncertain. However, using a set of alternative institutional indices related to economic 
freedom, Méon and Weill (2006) find evidence suggesting that such factors are strongly 
related to total factor productivity. 
 Our study, holding its obvious limitations in mind, suggests that at least part of the 
association may come about through the effects of economic freedom on the degree of 
entrepreneurship and thus the dynamism in the economy. Here, both direct and indirect 
channels may be important. The standard policy focus is on high-tech entrepreneurial 
activity having companies such as Microsoft, Intel or Vestas as only a few obvious 
examples. Some firm start-ups may naturally end up as major international factors, and 
increased entrepreneurial activity resulting from increased economic freedom will probably 
                                                 
12 While this to seem might seem a slightly farfetched possibility, it is worth stressing that QJE argue 
theoretically for the risk that welfare states can undermine citizens’ economic norms. Mokyr (2006) makes a 
similar argument that cultural beliefs played an important role in the Industrial Revolution, which was above 
anything else an entrepreneurial event. 
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increase the likelihood that such firms arise. As Mokyr (2006) emphasizes, for long-run 
growth to occur, sustained growth of knowledge and technology is necessary and that such 
growth comes about “because in each society, there are people who are creative and 
original, and motivated by some combination of greed, ambition, curiosity, and altruism”. It 
seems to us that Mokyr’s individual characteristics are stumblingly close to a standard 
definition of an entrepreneur, yet the main point of Mokyr’s chapter in the Handbook of 
Economic Growth is that these characteristics can only be employed fully in countries with 
the proper institutional framework, that is, in an environment of what would here be termed 
“economic freedom.” 
 Yet, it should also be stressed that entrepreneurial activity need not be of a 
sophisticated technological nature to add to economic performance. As stressed by Hayek 
(1968) many years ago, economic competition has important dynamic effects. Part of the 
effect of economic freedom on growth could therefore arise from more mundane reasons, 
for example if new firms increase the competition in product markets or in the production of 
factor inputs and intermediate goods. Given that economic freedom, through its effects on 
entrepreneurial activity, increases the competition and efficiency in intermediate goods 
markets, it could also result in improved efficiency in the production of final goods and 
thereby in improved economic performance. 
 As such, while we must stress that there are considerable limits to which conclusions 
one can derive from cross-country empirical work consisting of only 29 countries, the 
findings in this paper are both easily interpreted within standard theory of entrepreneurship, 
which it provides a test of, as well as fitting within a broader and much more extensive 
literature on economic freedom. With the necessary qualifications in mind, we therefore 
outline the conclusions and discuss implications in the final section. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 To sum up, the contribution of this work is to report a set of cross-country tests of the 
relation between entrepreneurship and economic freedom, basing our findings on existing 
theoretical literature. As such, we follow in the footsteps of Kreft and Sobel (2005) who 
show that across the US states, the level of entrepreneurial activity is significantly 
associated with economic freedom. We find that both the size of government and the quality 
of the monetary policy are strong determinants of entrepreneurship across a small sample of 
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29 countries for which there are comparable data on entrepreneurship. The access to sound 
money appears to be critical to both opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship. On the 
other hand, only governments’ share in total consumption affects necessity entrepreneurship 
while both government consumption, transfers and subsidies and the extent of taxation are 
negatively associated with opportunity entrepreneurship. Holding the limitations of our 
paper in mind, we must conclude that these findings outline what may be costs of a lack of 
economic freedom not often discussed in the literature. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Observations 
TEA 8.0874 3.911 29 
TEAOPP 5.519 2.807 29 
TEANEC 2.095 1.836 29 
Log GDP 9.731 .584 29 
Postcommunist .103 .309 29 
Government size 5.449 1.548 29 
 Consumption, % of 
GDP 
23.031 8.849 29 
 Transfers, % of GDP  15.961 6.908 28 
 Investment 11.844 6.515 18 
 Lack of taxation  4.586 2.151 29 
Legal quality 7.348 1.763 29 
Sound money 8.879 1.394 29 
International trade 7.821 .774 29 
Regulatory quality 6.241 .847 29 
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Table 2. Countries Included in This Study 
Country TEA TEAOPP TEANEC Country TEA TEAOPP TEANEC
Argentina 9.6 5.3 4.1 Mexico 20.2 13.3 6.8 
Australia 12.1 9.9 1.9 Netherlands 4.8 4.0 0.3 
Belgium 3.4 2.6 0.6 New Zealand 15.2 12.4 2.5 
Brazil 12.9 7.8 5.3 Norway 7.0 5.9 0.2 
Canada 9.1 6.2 2.6 Poland 7.1 3.4 3.5 
Denmark 5.6 4.6 0.3 Portugal 6.6 5.1 1.4 
Finland 5.1 3.9 0.5 Russia 6.0 4.3 1.0 
France 4.3 2.1 0.9 Singapore 5.9 4.6 1.1 
Germany 5.8 4.1 1.4 South Africa 8.2 5.5 2.3 
Hungary 10.9 7.6 3.2 South Korea 13.4 7.2 5.2 
India 11.7 5.0 6.6 Spain 6.0 4.0 1.4 
Ireland 9.7 7.2 1.8 Sweden 4.9 4.0 0.6 
Israel 3.8 1.4 0.5 United Kingdom 5.2 3.5 0.9 
Italy 8.2 6.3 1.7 USA 9.1 7.8 1.2 
Japan 2.9 1.3 1.2     
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Table 3. Macro Determinants of Entrepreneurial Activity 
 TEA TEA TEAOPP TEAOPP TEANEC TEANEC 
 OLS RR OLS RR OLS RR 
Log GDP -3.909*** 
(1.325) 
-3.989* 
(2.144) 
-1.725 
(1.038) 
-1.706 
(1.495) 
  -2.413*** 
(.338) 
-2.547*** 
(.505) 
Postcommunist .863 
(1.318) 
.469 
(2.807) 
.886 
(1.136) 
.842 
(1.958)   
.378 
(.456) 
.308 
(.804) 
Government size 2.124*** 
(.692) 
2.321*** 
(.721) 
1.740*** 
(.404) 
1.712*** 
(.503) 
.558** 
(.243) 
.600*** 
(.210) 
Legal quality .434 
(.644) 
.797 
(.883) 
.491 
(.494) 
.741 
(.616)   
.062 
(.197) 
.111 
(.259) 
Sound money 2.077*** 
(.714) 
2.582 
(1.728) 
1.304*** 
(.493) 
1.729 
(1.205) 
.899*** 
(.213) 
.937*** 
(.247) 
International trade -1.255 
(.793) 
-1.840 
(1.144)    
-.787 
(.566) 
-1.131 
(.798) 
-.545** 
(.250) 
-.529* 
(.312) 
Regulatory quality -.785 
(1.670) 
-1.442 
(1.757) 
-.449 
(1.047) 
-.872 
(1.225) 
-.420 
(.565) 
-.596 
(.508) 
       
Observations 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Adjusted R2 .526 - .409 - .832 - 
F statistic 4.11 2.52 2.94 2.22 14.86 11.24 
RMSE 2.740 - 2.196 - .766 - 
Note: all regressions include dummies for Asia, Sub-Saharan African, Latin America and the Caribbean, and 
the MENA region; *** (**) [*] denotes significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. The variance inflation factor is 
3.76 in all OLS regressions. Note also that actual trade does not matter. 
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Table 4. Effects of Specific Factors of Government Size 
 TEANEC TEANEC TEANEC TEANEC TEAOPP TEAOPP TEAOPP TEAOPP 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Log GDP -2.159*** 
(.279) 
-2.332*** 
( .596) 
-2.598*** 
(.488) 
-2.588*** 
(.394) 
.008 
(.782) 
-.746 
(1.324) 
-4.021* 
(2.335)  
-1.345 
(1.176) 
Postcommunist -.417 
(.775) 
.566 
(.654) 
2.334 
(1.602) 
.476 
(.491) 
-1.895 
(1.207) 
.619 
(1.687) 
9.514 
(6.458)   
.591 
(1.705) 
Sound money .706*** 
(.146) 
.659*** 
(.129) 
1.113*** 
(.378) 
.652*** 
(.122) 
1.015*** 
(.306) 
1.132*** 
(.513) 
  2.862* 
(1.534) 
1.007* 
(.537) 
Government:         
 Consumption, 
% of GDP 
-.104*** 
(.021) 
   -.282*** 
(.062) 
   
 Transfers, % 
of GDP  
 -.060 
(.038) 
   -.277** 
(.131) 
  
 Investment   -.106 
(.069) 
   -.019 
(.227) 
 
 Lack of 
taxation  
   .139 
(.093) 
   .549** 
(.272) 
Observations 29 28 18 29 29 28 29 29 
Adjusted R 
Square 
.874 .792 .786 .785 .353 .211 .109 .286 
F statistic 28.84 15.70 9.89 13.53 3.18 2.03 -  
RMSE .662 .863 1.001 .919 2.298 2.475 3.315 2.788 
Note: all regressions include dummies for Asia, Sub-Saharan African, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the MENA 
region. 
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Figure 1. Government and Entreprenurial Activity
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